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EXPLAINING HOUSE PRICE FLUCTUATIONS∗
Christian Hott
Abstract
A comparison of fundamental house prices with actual prices indicates that house
prices ﬂuctuate more than fundamentally justiﬁed. This fact is very hard to explain with
standard rational agent models. This paper develops a housing market model that allows
to examine the price eﬀects of various kinds of agents’ expectations. In this framework I
we show that the consideration of behavioural aspects like herding behaviour, speculation
and momentum trading can help to explain actual house price ﬂuctuations. Following the
diﬀerent approaches, agents overreact to fundamentals and are inﬂuenced by past price
movements and returns.
Keywords: House Prices, Bubbles, Investor Behaviour.
JEL-Classiﬁcations: G11, G12, R21.
1 Introduction
Since Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) we know that stock prices ﬂuctuate much
more than fundamentally justiﬁed. But what about house prices? In line with the phrase as
safe as houses, it is (or at least it was) a widespread opinion that an investment in a house
is a very safe decision. The recent burst of the housing bubbles in the US, the UK and many
other countries has eroded this opinion, however.
Before the burst of the bubbles people saw many good reasons why house prices should
be high. First of all many countries experienced a long episode of low interest rates and a
relatively stable economic environment. Therefore, more people could aﬀord more expensive
∗I would like to thank Signe Krogstrup, Pierre Monnin, an anonymous referee and the participants of the
43rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure & Competition at the Chicago Fed for their helpful comments.
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houses and house prices increased. A problem was that many people started to believe that
the benign conditions stay forever. In addition, the fact that house prices increased very
strongly for some time made people believe that prices will also increase in the future. This
led also to speculation and some households even started to buy second homes in order to
proﬁt from price increases. In order to climb up the property ladder, younger households
felt pressure to buy a house before prices got too high. As a result of this focus on the
momentum of prices, speculation and herding behaviour, house prices increased much more
than the development of fundamentals would have justiﬁed. Since this development was
not sustainable, house prices in many countries started to going down again. House prices
ﬂuctuated very strongly already in the past. The previous wave of house price bubbles and
crashes happened a round 1990 in countries like Japan, Switzerland and the UK. This raises
the question if there are fundamental reasons for these ﬂuctuations or if other factors were
driving forces.
To see if house prices ﬂuctuate more than fundamentally justiﬁed, we calculate a funda-
mental house price and compare it to the actual price for six diﬀerent countries: Switzerland
(CH), Ireland (IRL), Japan (JAP), the Netherlands (NL), the UK and the US. While the
house price development in each of these countries was diﬀerent, they all experienced at least
one housing cycle within the past 30 years. In CH, JAP and the UK a pronounced house price
boom came to an end around 1990. Since then UK house prices revived again and increased
very strongly between 1996 and 2007, CH house prices increased only moderately and real
JAP house prices continued to decrease. While in the US and especially in IRL house prices
increased very strongly between 1996 and 2006, in the NL the strongest increase was already
between 1990 and 2000 (see Figure 2).
A very common way of assessing the fundamental value of houses is to look at the imputed
rent of a house.1 This imputed rent of a house reﬂects the costs that arise from owning a
house for one period. In equilibrium these costs should be equal to the costs of renting
a house for one period (actual rent). However, the problem is that actual rents are not
necessarily fundamentally justiﬁed. Therefore, like Hott and Monnin (2008), to calculate the
fundamental value of houses, in this paper we assume that imputed rents are equal to the
1Prominent examples are Poterba (1992) and Himmelberg et al. (2005).
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fundamental value of rents.
The comparison of the resulting fundamental house prices with the corresponding actual
prices indicates that house prices ﬂuctuate more than fundamentally justiﬁed. One reason
for this is that the fundamental model assumes that investors are rational and have perfect
foresight. These are rather strong assumptions. Hence, to explain the divergent development,
we develop several variations of the basic model with alternative assumptions about expecta-
tions. More precisely, we include the mechanism of existing models of investor behaviour, i.e.
speculative bubbles, momentum trading and herding behaviour, into our house-price model
and examine their inﬂuence on the development of prices.
The speculative bubble approach is based on Froot and Obstfeld’s (1991) “intrinsic bub-
bles”. Thereafter, the price of an asset is given by the sum of present value of future dividends
(or in our case rents) and a bubble term. If the bubble term depends on the development of
fundamentals, this leads to an overreaction to these fundamentals.
The momentum approach is based on Hong and Stein’s (1999) “newswatchers” and “mo-
mentum traders”. Thereafter, expectations are partly inﬂuenced by fundamentals and partly
inﬂuenced by the momentum of the price development. This leads to higher amplitudes and
a higher persistence of price ﬂuctuations.
Finally, the herding behaviour approach is based on Lux (1995). He develops a model
where there is a positive feedback eﬀect between the development of market prices and in-
vestors’ sentiment. Increasing prices enhance the sentiment of investors. The more optimistic
investors push the price even higher and the sentiment increases further. The opposite is the
case when the price declines. These eﬀects ampliﬁes house price ﬂuctuations.
The calibration of the diﬀerent model variations indicates that these alternative assump-
tions on investor behaviour can help to explain the ﬂuctuations of actual house prices. This
examination of behavioural aspects in a house price model is the main innovation of this
paper.2
In the next section we present the basic model of fundamental house prices. We also
describe the calibration of the model and present the results. In section 3 we examine the
2Brunnermeier and Julliard (2008) also aim to explain the diﬀerence between rational (or fundamental)
house prices and actual house prices. The authors concentrate their analysis on the eﬀects of inﬂation and
their results suggests that money illusion might aﬀect the actual house price development. This ﬁnding does
not contradict our ﬁndings, instead it can be seen as an additional source of house price ﬂuctuations.
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eﬀects of diﬀerent forms of expectations regarding the development of house prices. Section
4 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 The Fundamental Value of Houses
2.1 The Model
In this section we develop a model that enables me to calculate the fundamental value of
houses. A feature of the housing market is that houses serve as an investment as well as
a good that serves utility.3 Hence, the following model combines the asset and the market
view of house prices. We start with the asset view, where the house price is deﬁned as the
present value of future imputed rents. The fundamental value of (imputed) rents will then
be calculated over a market equilibrium. By replacing the imputed rent in the present value
equation by its fundamental value, we get an equation for the fundamental value of houses.
The Asset View: The starting point of the calculation of fundamental house prices is the
imputed rent. Imputed rents are deﬁned as the sum of the costs that arise from owning a
house per period. As a fraction of the house price these costs are also known as the user costs
of housing.
The literature is proposing diﬀerent factors to capturing the imputed rent of a house.
Poterba (1984 and 1992), McCarthy and Peach (2004) and Himmelberg et al. (2005), for
example, use very similar factors to deﬁne imputed rents: On the one hand, the owner of a
house has to pay the mortgage rate (or the opportunity costs in the form of missed interest
rate payments), the house is subject to depreciation and the owner has to pay for maintenance,
repairs and property taxes. Furthermore, he or she bears the risk of a change in house prices
or unforeseeable investment needs which has to be compensated by a risk premium. On the
other hand, the owner of a house can proﬁt from potential capital gains.
Like Hott and Monnin (2008), we combine the above mentioned factors into three main
factors to calculate the user costs of a house: The ﬁrst factor is the mortgage rate mt in
period t. The second factor is the sum of maintenance costs (as a fraction of the house price)
and a risk premium. This factor is reﬂected by the constant parameter ρ.
3Correspondingly Holly and Jones (1997, p 553) write: “The determination of house prices can be considered
in two complementary ways: as the outcome of a market for the services of the housing stock and as an asset.”
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The third factor is the expected capital gain. Dougherty and Van Order (1982), for
example, assume that real house prices are constant and Himmelberg et al. (2005) use the
interest rate spread and the average real growth rate of house prices to predict their future
nominal growth rate. While these assumptions might be adequate for the purpose of their
studies, they are not suitable for the calculation of a fundamental house price. We instead will
calculate the expected capital gain via the expected house price in the next period [Et(Pt+1)]
and a constant physical depreciation (δ) of houses. Hence, as a fraction of the current house
price the expected capital gain is [(1 − δ)Et(Pt+1) − Pt]/Pt.
To calculate the imputed rent Ht of a house, we multiply the resulting user costs with
the price of a house and get:
Ht = (mt + ρ + 1)Pt − (1 − δ)Et(Pt+1). (1)
Rearranging equation (1) yields the following house price equation:
Pt =
Ht + (1 − δ)Et(Pt+1)
Rt
, (2)
where Rt = 1+ρ+mt. To get the expected house price, we assume that agents are rational.























This result is very similar to Shillers (1981) “simple eﬃcient markets model” whereafter the
price of a stock should be equal to the sum of all future discounted dividends.4 Following
equation (4), the fundamental price of a house is driven by present and future imputed rents
and mortgage rates.
It is very common to assume that imputed rents are equivalent to the corresponding
actual rents. This assumption is equivalent to assuming that there is a no-arbitrage condition
between buying and renting a house. However, we do not know if rents are fundamentally
4Shiller (1981) uses a constant discount factor and an observable real dividend.
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justiﬁed. The rent market might be, for example, inﬂuenced by imperfect information or by
government intervention. Hence, to calculate the fundamental value of houses, we need to
calculate the fundamental value of rents as well.
The Market View: To calculate the fundamental value of rents, we assume that they are
the outcome of a market for housing. In other words, Ht leads to a demand for housing which
is equal to the supply of housing.
We start with the demand side of the market for housing. Note that this demand is not
equal to the demand for houses. It is only the demand for the right to occupy a house for
one period (by renting or by buying it). This demand is derived from agents’ utility function
and their budget restriction. We assume that in period t there are Nt identical individuals
which derive their utility from consumption ct and the occupation of housing units dt. Their
utility Ut is assumed to be:5
Ut =
￿
dt − ¯ d
￿α c1−α
t , (5)
where α reﬂects the strength of the preferences for housing compared to the preferences for
consumption. The parameter ¯ d is the minimum housing demand of the agent under the
condition that he or she can aﬀord it.
To derive the budget restriction of agents we assume that the income of each agent is yt.
The price of the consumption good is normalized to one and the period cost for the right to
occupy one housing unit (rent or imputed rent) is Ht. For simpliﬁcation we further assume
that agents do not have the possibility to save money and to transfer utility into the future.6
Therefore, agents spend their entire income on consumption and housing:
yt = Htdt + ct. (6)
The utility maximizing demand for housing is:
5Pain and Westaway (1997) and Schwab (1982) also assume that the utility depends on consumption and
housing. While they assume that the consumption good and the housing units are substitutes, we assume
that they are complementary goods.
6Usually, the consideration of savings and, thereby, the intertemporal distribution of wealth is necessary
and important to link today’s market equilibrium to the future development of fundamentals. In our model,





+ (1 − α)¯ d. (7)
Hence, with a positive minimum housing demand ¯ d, the resulting optimal housing expendi-
tures (dtHt) of an agent does increase less than proportional with his or her income - which
is a realistic result. Since all agents are assumed to be equal, we can calculate the aggregate





+ (1 − α)¯ dNt, (8)
where Yt = ytNt is aggregate income. Aggregated demand for housing, therefore, depends
on the imputed rent, the number of agents (or population) and aggregate income (or GDP).
This result is consistent with the literature. Case and Shiller (2003), for example, consider
personal income per capita, population, employment and the unemployment rate and Collyns
and Sendhadji (2002) name the real GDP as a measure for the aggregate level of income and
population.
To calculate the equilibrium imputed rent, we also need to consider ﬂuctuations in the
supply of housing units.7 The supply of housing units (St) is positively inﬂuenced by the
construction of new housing units (Bt) and negatively inﬂuenced by the depreciation (δ) of
existing housing units. We assume that construction takes one period and leads to Bt new
housing units in t + 1. Backward iteration shows that today’s housing supply is determined
by all former construction activities, the depreciation rate and the initial housing stock S0:
St = (1 − δ)St−1 + Bt−1 = (1 − δ)tS0 +
t ￿
j=1
(1 − δ)j−1Bt−j. (9)




+ (1 − α)¯ dNt = St. (10)
By rearranging this equation we get the fundamental value of rents:





St − (1 − α)¯ dNt
= α
Yt
(1 − δ)tS0 +
￿t
j=1(1 − δ)j−1Bt−j − (1 − α)¯ dNt
. (11)
The Fundamental House Price Equation: By replacing imputed rents in price equation








j=0Rt+j − (1 − α)¯ dNt
￿
. (12)
Equation (12) implies that the fundamental value of houses is driven by present and future ag-
gregated income, population and mortgage rates and by past, present and future construction
activities.
2.2 Data
Before calibrating this fundamental house price for diﬀerent countries, we will brieﬂy present
the required data. We will examine the housing markets in Switzerland (CH), Ireland (IRL),
Japan (JAP), the Netherlands (NL), the UK and the US. Each of these housing markets
experienced at least one house price cycle within the past 30 years. However, the house price
development was diﬀerent in each of these countries. This fact provides a good test for the
model and the overall approach.
According to equation (11) and (12) we need data on GDP (Yt), construction (Bt), pop-
ulation (Nt) and mortgage rates (mt) for all six countries. Calibration also requires data on
actual rents (Mt) and actual house prices (Pa
t ). To transform the nominal series into real
ones, we need data on the development of the CPI (CPIt). With the exception of population
(Nt) the frequency of the data series is quarterly. The series on population data is trans-
formed into quarterly data by linear interpolation. The time horizon of the diﬀerent series
varies, but they all capture at least one property-price cycle. The main sources are the BIS,
the IMF, and the OECD. For more details on the data, see Appendix A.
2.3 Calibration
To calibrate fundamental house prices we assume that agents are rational and have perfect
foresight.8 We can, therefore, replace the expected future fundamentals in price equation
8This assumption is equivalent to the “ex post rational prices” in Shiller’s (1981) work on stock prices.
88 9
(12) by their actual values. There are two problems left: (i) we do not know how the
fundamentals evolve after the end of the data sample and (ii) we have to ﬁnd adequate values
for the diﬀerent parameters.
The Future Values of Fundamentals: Following the price equation (12), the calculation
of the fundamental house price requires all future fundamentals up to inﬁnity. In lack of such
data, we have to make assumptions about the development of fundamentals after the end of
the data sample (period T).
For simplicity we assume that Ht evolves at the constant growth rate w and that mortgage
rates stay constant from period T + 1 on:
HT+i+1 = (1 + w)HT+i and
mT+i+1 = ¯ m,
where i ≥ 0. The choice of the parameters w and ¯ m has a substantial impact on fundamental
house prices at the end of the sample and also on their recent development. Though, its
inﬂuence on the earlier prices and past price ﬂuctuations is rather small. Hence, for the
purpose of this study, our rough estimates of the parameter values are suﬃcient. If, on the
other hand, someone wants to judge the present price level, he or she has to be much more
careful. Another possibility would have been to make an assumption about the future price
directly. Though, our approach enables me to check if the future price increase is implausible
high or low.




ρ + ¯ m + δ − w + δw
. (13)
To calculate this future fundamental house price, we need values for the two additional
parameters: w and ¯ m.
We now turn to ﬁnding adequate values for the diﬀerent parameters: the preference
(marginal rate of substitution) α, the minimum housing demand ¯ d, the depreciation rate δ,
the sum of maintenance costs and the risk premium ρ and, to calculating the fundamental
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house price in T + 1, the growth rate of the imputed rent w and the average mortgage rate
¯ m. In addition to this, note that some of the data series are expressed as an index, meaning
that the levels of the diﬀerent series are not directly comparable. Hence, to compare the right
sides of equation (11), (12) or (13) with their left sides, we need suitable conversion factors.
The Calibration of Fundamental Rents: In a ﬁrst step to calculate fundamental house
prices we use the fact that imputed rents (Ht) are equal to the fundamental values of the
observed rents (Mt). While in the short run, actual rents can deviate from their fundamental
values, in the long run, they do not develop completely independent. Hence, we will choose
parameter values (α, ¯ d, δ and S0) that will minimise the mean square diﬀerence (MSE)
between actual and imputed rents. While doing this we also have to make sure that the
parameter values are not implausibly high or low.
The ﬁrst parameter is α. Equation (11) states that α does not have an eﬀect on the
growth rates of Ht, but only on its level. As already mentioned, we also need a conversion
factor to adjust the level of rents. If we multiply α with a conversion factor we get the new
parameter α1. It is obvious to assume that this parameter should be positive, but there is
no upper bound to this parameter. This is true for all six countries in our sample.
The second parameter is the constant minimum housing demand ¯ d. In the rent equation
(11) this parameter is multiplied with the constant (1 − α). We deﬁne a new parameter
ˆ d = (1−α)¯ d and assume the lower bound for this new parameter is zero and that there is no
upper bound. This applies to all six countries in the sample.
The third parameter is the depreciation rate δ. Harding et al. (2006) estimate that, net of
maintenance, the yearly depreciation rate is 1.9 percent. McCarthy and Peach (2004) assume
that the depreciation rate plus repairs is 2.5 percent per year, Pain and Westaway (1997)
assume a depreciation rate of 0.9 percent and Poterba (1992) assumes two percent. We do
not assume a particular depreciation rate but allow a (plausible) range. We assume for all
six countries identical lower and upper bounds for the parameter δ: They are zero and four
percent, respectively.
The forth parameter is the initial housing stock S0. The only restriction to this parameter
is that it can not be negative. Therefore, we assume that the lower bound of S0 is zero and
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that there is no upper bound. This applies to all six countries.








(1 − δ)tS0 +
￿t




subject to: α1 ≥ 0, ˆ d ≥, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 0.04 and S0 ≥ 0.
To solve this minimisation problem, we use the “solver” from Microsoft-EXEL. The results
of the calibration are displayed in Figure 1. For comparison actual rents are displayed as well.
As we can see, the development of rents is quite smooth compared to the development of
house prices (see Figure 2). We can also see that the ﬁt between actual and fundamental
rents is quite good. According to Table 1 the mean deviation of the fundamental rents form
the actual values varies between 1.4% (US) and 11.9% (IRL).
Table 1 also shows the diﬀerent parameter values. Thereafter, in ﬁve out of the six
countries δ is very small. On the other hand, in these countries α1 and S0 are relatively high.
The eﬀect of this combination of parameter values is that construction and, therefore, the
change in supply has only a small eﬀect on the development of rents. However, the overall
eﬀect of the parameter δ on the fundamental rent is rather low. If, for example, the parameter
δ would be 4% in these ﬁve countries, the mean deviation of the fundamental rents from the
actual rents would increase by only between 0.3 (UK) and 3.8 (CH) percent points.
Another noticeable point with regard to the parameter values is that for the UK ˆ d is zero
and therefore at its lower bound. Following equation (14) this implies that the development
of the population Nt has no direct eﬀect on rents (although it still has an indirect eﬀect
via aggregated income Yt = ytNt). However, the fundamental rent is not very sensitive to
changes in the parameter ˆ d. Even if it would be 30 (highest value for the other countries),
the mean deviation of the fundamental rents from the actual rents would increase by only
0.15 percent points.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
[Insert Table 1 about here]
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Calibration of Fundamental House Prices: In the second step of the calibration we
adjust the fundamental house prices (P∗
t ) to the development of actual house prices (Pa
t ).
To calculate fundamental house prices we use the calibrated series for Ht. The remaining
parameters are the sum of maintenance costs and risk premium ρ, the future growth rate of
imputed rents w, the future mortgage rate ¯ m and a conversion factor α2.
To get appropriate limits for the parameter ρ we add up the limits of maintenance costs
and risk premium. Harding et al. (2006) estimate that maintenance costs are between 0.5
and one percent. Poterba (1992), on the other hand, assumes that maintenance costs are
about two percent. We assume that the lower and upper bounds of the maintenance costs
are zero and three percent, respectively.
There are also diﬀerent assumptions with regard to the risk premium: Himmelberg et
al. (2005) assume that the risk premium is two percent, Pain and Westaway (1997) assume
that it is between two and eight percent and Poterba (1992) assumes four percent. Sinai and
Souleles (2005), on the other hand, point out that there is also a risk of rent changes. If
someone buys a house he or she bears the risk of changes in the house price but he or she
avoids the risk of a change of the rent. Therefore, the risk premium for owning a house can
be positive or negative. Since the risk of house price changes only materializes if the house is
sold but rent changes can materialize in each period the overall risk premium depends on the
time someone wants to keep a certain house. In this paper we assume that the risk premium
is between -1 and 9 percent. Hence, altogether, the lower and upper bound for the parameter
ρ in each country is -1 and 12 percent, respectively.
As already mentioned, the choice of the parameter w and ¯ m has mainly an eﬀect on the
development of the resulting fundamental house prices at the end of the sample and barely
inﬂuences past price ﬂuctuations. Nevertheless, we consider realistic boundaries for these
parameters, by looking at country speciﬁc developments. To ﬁnd appropriate values for the
future growth rate of imputed rents (w), we look at historical growth rates in the diﬀerent
countries. First, we compute the average growth rates of the imputed rents by considering
the complete sample, the previous twenty and the previous ten years. Then, in order to set
the upper bound for the parameter, We round up the maximum of the three growth rates to
the next 0.5 percent and add 0.5 percent. For the lower bound we round down the minimum
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of the three growth rates to the next 0.5 percent and subtract 0.5 percent. Thereafter, the
lower and upper bounds for CH are 0 and 2 percent, for IRL they are -3 and 1.5 percent, for
JAP -2 and 1.5 percent, for NL 1 and 3 percent, for the UK 0.5 and 2.5 percent and for the
US -0.5 and 1.5 percent.
For the parameter ¯ m we look at historical real mortgage rates in the diﬀerent countries.
Corresponding to the choice of the boundaries for the growth rates of the imputed rents we
compute the average real mortgage rate of the complete sample, the previous twenty and
the previous ten years. Then, to set the upper bound for the parameter, we round up the
maximum of the three mortgage rates to the next 0.5 percent and add 0.5 percent. For
the lower bound we round down the minimum of the three mortgage rates to the next 0.5
percent and subtract 0.5 percent. Thereafter, the lower and upper bounds for CH are 1.5
and 4 percent, for IRL they are 0.5 and 4.5 percent, for JAP 1.5 and 3.5 percent, for NL 2
and 5 percent, for the UK 2 and 5 percent and for the US 3 and 5.5 percent.
For the conversion factor α2 we only assume that it is positive. As a result, we have to













subject to: α2 > 0, −0.01 < ρ < 0.12 and the corresponding upper and lower bounds of w
and ¯ m. The house price in period T + 1 (P∗
T+1) is calculated according to equation (13).
The results of the calibration are presented in Figure 2. For comparison, actual house
prices are displayed as well. As we can see, actual house prices are much more volatile than
fundamental prices. On average the variance of the growth rates of actual prices V ar(ΔPa
t )
is almost six times higher than the variance of the growth rates of fundamental house prices
V ar(ΔP∗
t ). However, according to Table 2 this proportion diﬀers between countries. In
Japan, the Netherland and Switzerland it is very high. In Ireland and the US, on the other
hand, the proportion is rather low. A reason for the low proportion in the US might be that
its housing market is very large and regional excess volatility might be evened out. Another
reason might be that we look at the rather smooth development of the OFHEO Index as a
reference for US house prices. The Variance of the Case Shiller National Home Price Index,
for example, is about twice as high. In Ireland the proportion is low because the variance of
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the fundamental house price is high as well. Until the mid 1980s Ireland experienced a rather
negative development. However, between the end of the 1990s and the end of the sample,
the country grew with an enormous pace. This change is reﬂected in the high variance of the
growth rates of actual as well as fundamental house prices.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
On average fundamental house prices deviate by about 17% from actual house prices. Follow-
ing Table 2 the lowest average price deviation is in the US (8%) meaning that actual house
prices are reﬂected by the fundamental model quite well. The highest average deviation is in
IRL (32%). Here the ﬁt between actual and fundamental house prices is rather poor.
In each of the six countries under consideration, there are phases of substantial under-
and overvaluations. We can easily detect price bubbles around 1990 in CH (45% higher
than the fundamental house price), JAP (30%) and the UK (55%). These overvaluations
are also indicated by other studies. Ayuso and Restoy (2006), for example, identify the UK
bubble by comparing the development of the actual price-to-rent ratio with its equilibrium
path. Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) also examine the UK housing boom around 1990 and
conclude that the housing market is far from eﬃcient. Stone and Ziemba (1996, p 163) argue
that it appears likely that the Japanese housing boom in the late 1980s “... went somewhat
beyond what could be justiﬁed based on fundamental factors.”
When we look at Figure 2, in general the peaks seem to be more pronounced than the
troughs. This is also indicated by the maximum and minimum relative price diﬀerence
between actual and fundamental house prices as shown in Table 2. Thereafter, on average
the maximum price deviation at the peaks is about 70% higher than the maximum price
deviation at the troughs. This is consistent with the conventional view that bubbles are a
positive deviation of the price from its fundamental value. A reason for this might be that,
especially in housing markets, short selling is much more diﬃcult than pushing a price up by
extensively buying an asset. Diba and Grossman (1988, p 747) even argue that there are no
negative rational bubbles and write:
“The fact that rational bubbles have explosive conditional expectations implies
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that a negative rational-bubbles component cannot exist, because, given free dis-
posal, stock holders cannot rationally expect a stock price to decrease without
bound and, hence, to become negative at a ﬁnite future date.”
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Table 3 shows the values of the diﬀerent parameters. There are two noticeable points with
regard to these parameter values. Firstly, for JAP and the US the parameter ρ (sum of
maintenance costs and risk premium) is at its upper bound of 12%. A reason for this might
be that real interest rates were very volatile (in each of the six countries), especially in the
1970s. A high ρ lowers the price eﬀect of changing mortgage rates. This in turn implies that
the inﬂuence mortgage rates on house prices in JAP and the US was rather low. However,
the eﬀect of the parameter ρ on the price development is rather small. Even with a ρ of -1
(lower bound), the average deviation of the house price from its fundamental value in JAP
and the US would increase by only 3 and 2 percent points, respectively.
The second noticeable point with regard to the parameter values is that all values for
future mortgage rates ¯ m and for future growth rates w are either at their upper or their
lower bounds. As already mentioned, these parameters have mainly an eﬀect on the recent
development of fundamental house prices. A high w and a low ¯ m indicate that prices are
currently rather high and a low w and a high ¯ m indicate that prices are currently rather
low. For IRL, the NL, the UK and the US the parameter w is at its upper bound and the
parameter ¯ m is at its lower bound. Despite these parameter values actual house prices in
these countries are noticeably higher than their fundamental values at the end of the data
sample. This indicates that prices in these countries were rather high at the end of the data
sample in late 2007. The opposite is the case in CH and JAP. These results are consistent with
the ﬁndings of other studies. Ayuso and Restoy (2006), for example, show that price-to-rent
ratios recently exceeded their fundamental values in the UK and the US. Also Shiller (2007,
p 4) argues that the recent “... dramatic price increase is hard to explain, since economic
fundamentals do not match up with the price increases.”
[Insert Table 3 about here]
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3 Why Do House Prices Fluctuate More Than Fundamentally
Justiﬁed?
The result that actual asset prices ﬂuctuate more than fundamentally justiﬁed is not a new
ﬁnding. Starting with Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) many studies have exam-
ined the relationship between actual and fundamental prices in stock markets.9 These studies
show that actual prices cannot be fully explained by the fundamental (present value) model.
Shiller (1981, p 434) argues:
“The failure of the eﬃcient markets model is thus so dramatic that it would
seem impossible to attribute the failure to such things as data errors, price index
problems, or changes in tax laws.”
Shiller attributes the diﬀerences to irrational behaviour of the investors. In our basic
model we not only assume that people are rational but also that they have perfect foresight,10
and thereby make very strong assumptions about investors’ forecasting abilities. To describe
real world developments, these assumptions have to be relaxed. Coakley and Fuertes (2006),
however, point out that prices reﬂect fundamentals in the long run.11 This is also the case in
our model. Therefore, the development of the price cannot be completely independent from
fundamentals.
Theoretical literature is oﬀering diﬀerent possible explanations for excess price ﬂuctu-
ations or the occurrence of price bubbles. Very popular ideas are: speculative bubbles,
momentum trading and herding behaviour. We will apply these three explanations to our
basic house-price model by transforming existing and established models. But before that, we
will look at a rather simple form of adaptive expectations: constant user costs. The main
purpose of this additional approach is to lay the ground for the introduction of the three
main model variations. However, already the constant user costs approach provides some
interesting results. We will calibrate all four model variations for the six countries under
9Coakley and Fuertes (2006), for example, analyze the time-series dynamics of post 1870 S&P valuation
ratios. Their results indicate that prices can deviate substantial from their fundamental value in the short
run. Zhong et al. (2003) examine the behaviour of post-World War II US-stock prices. They conclude that
the present value model is unable to explain actual market behaviour.
10With his ex-post rationality, Shiller (1981) implicitly also assumes that investors have perfect foresight.
11Hott and Monnin (2006) ﬁnd evidence that in the long run house prices go back to a fundamental value
that is very similar to the fundamental house price in the present paper.
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consideration: Switzerland, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, the UK and the US.
3.1 Constant User Costs
In this section we assume that investors do not react to changes in the interest rate. This
is equivalent to assume that they do not react to changes in user costs. Instead, they react
to their current income and the current supply of houses (or the imputed rent). However,
investors forecast that future imputed rents will grow with the constant rate w up to inﬁnity.
Expectations about future fundamentals are hence: Ek
t (Ht+i) = (1 +w)iHt and Ek
t (mt+i) =
¯ m, where i ≥ 0 and Ek
t is the period t expectation according to the constant user costs
model variation. By making these assumptions, we put more weight on the development of
the imputed rents and no weight on the development of interest rates.
Holly and Jones (1997), for example, conclude that income is the single most important
determinant of house prices. In our model income is an important driver of imputed rents.
Therefore, by putting more weight on the development of imputed rents, the ﬁt to actual
prices should improve. Froot and Obstfeld (1991) provide another argument for this. They
point out that the part of the (stock) price development that is not explained by the funda-
mental price is highly positively correlated with dividends. In our model, the imputed rent
can be interpreted as the dividend of a house.
Following above assumptions the constant user costs house price (Pk











¯ R − 1 + δ − w + δw
, (17)
where ¯ R = 1+ρ+ ¯ m. We calibrate this model variation in the same way as the fundamental
house price in section 2.3: We chose parameter values for δ, ρ, ¯ m and w that minimise the
MSE of Pk
t . The results are shown in Figure 3. For comparison fundamental and actual
house prices (P∗
t and Pa
t ) are displayed as well.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
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As we can see, in some countries and during some episodes, Pk
t can better explain actual
prices than the fundamental model. This is especially true for the price bubbles around 1990
in CH and JAP. According to the mean square errors, Pk
t can better explain actual prices
than P∗
t in these two countries.12 This indicates that in these countries investors might have
put too much weight on their current income and have not considered that their income might
change in the future.
3.2 Speculative Bubble
When it comes to over- or undervaluations of assets speculative behaviour is often named as
a possible reason. Under speculation the investment decision is at least partially inﬂuenced
by expected changes of the corresponding asset price. This could lead to a situation where a
price increases only because investors believe that the price will increase in the next period,
because they expect that the price will further increase in the period after that and so on.
This idea is formalized by Froot and Obstfeld (1991). The authors look at a typical stock
pricing model where the price of a stock depends on the dividend, the price of the stock in
the next period and a discount rate. In this setting forward iteration leads to a stock price
that is equal to the sum of all discounted future dividends. Froot and Obstfeld, however,
show that this present value solution is only a particular solution to the stochastic diﬀerence
price equation. The general solution is that the price is equal to the present value of future
dividends and a (rational) bubble term that has to fulﬁl several requirements. Now the
authors assume that this bubble term only depends on fundamentals. Hence, the dynamic of
the bubble is entirely driven by the dynamic of fundamentals.
To be able to introduce this bubble term easily in our model and in line with Froot
and Obstfeld, we assume that expectations according to the speculative bubble model varia-
tion (Eb
t) are equivalent to the expectations according to the constant user costs approach:
Eb
t(Ht+i) = Ek
t (Ht+i) = (1+w)iHt and Eb
t(mt+i) = Ek
t (mt+i) = ¯ m. Corresponding to Froot










t is the house price according to the speculative bubble model, λ =
ρ+ ¯ m+δ
w and the
parameter z is an arbitrary constant.
The ﬁrst term of the right hand side of (18) is equivalent to (17) and can be called the
present value term. The second term is the bubble term, meaning that as long as z is not
equal to zero there is a bubble. Since the development of the bubble term depends on the de-
velopment of fundamentals, we can expect an overreaction to changes in these fundamentals.
Furthermore, if the derivation of the bubble term with respect to the fundamental factor Ht
is higher than one, the price eﬀect of an x% above average Ht is stronger than the price eﬀect
of an x% below average Ht. This can be seen as a possible explanation for the fact that peaks
are often more pronounced than troughs.
Note that z can also get negative and, therefore, there is the possibility of a negative
bubble. This stands in contrast to Diba and Grossman’s (1988) argument that negative
rational bubbles cannot exist because the bubble term has to develop exponential and it is
not rational for investors to expect that prices decrease further and further and get negative.
However, in our model, as well as in Froot and Obstfeld (1991), the development of the bubble
term depends on the expected constant growth rate (w) of a fundamental factor. Hence, not
only the bubble term but also the present value term is expected to grow exponentially. If the
expected positive path of the present value term overcompensates the negative development
of the bubble term, there can be a negative bubble and prices are not expected to get negative
in the future.
The bubble price Pb
t can be calibrated in the same way as the fundamental house price in
section 2.3. Only now we also have to chose the value for the parameter z that leads to the
lowest MSE. We do not assume any boundaries to this parameter.
The results of the calibration are shown in Figure 4. As we can see, in most countries the
bubble term can help to explain actual house price ﬂuctuations. This is especially true for
the house price bubbles around 1990 in JAP and the recent price increase in the NL, the UK
and the US. According to the mean square errors, Pb
t improves the ﬁt to actual prices in all
but one country (IRL). Note that following equation (18) the ﬁt between Pb
t and Pa
t cannot
get weaker than the ﬁt between Pk
t and Pa
t . The reason for this is that z can get zero and,
therefore, Pb
t = Pk
t . However, for each of the countries the parameter z is positive. Overall,
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the results indicate that speculation might have been a reason for an over- or undervaluation
of houses in some countries. Compared to the results from the constant user costs approach
the bubble term improves the results especially for the NL, the UK and the US.13 For these
three countries the derivation of the bubble term with respect to the fundamental factor Ht is
higher than one. This implies that prices at the peaks deviate more from their fundamental
values than prices at the troughs, which is consistent with the general ﬁndings in section 2.3.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
3.3 Momentum Trading
In this section we assume that the past development of house prices has a positive inﬂuence
on expectations about future prices. Thereafter, investors expect house prices to increase if
they have observed that prices increased in the past or if they heard that a neighbor just made
a big proﬁt on the investment in a house. Since prices tend to go back to their fundamental
value in the long run, expectations cannot solely rely on the momentum of prices. Hong and
Stein (1999) develop a model with two types of investors: “newswatchers” and “momentum
traders”. They show that momentum traders accelerate the reaction of prices to news and
that this can lead to an overreaction of the price. In their model momentum traders are
very similar to the newswatchers. The only diﬀerence is that they base their forecasts on the
cumulative price change over the past k periods: Pt−1 − Pt−k−1.
To convert this idea in a form that is suitable for our housing model, we assume that
the representative investor makes his or her forecasts partially on basis of fundamentals and
partially on basis of the momentum of the price. This leads to the following house price:
P∗m
t =
Ht + (1 − δ)(μP∗




where the parameter 0 ≤ μ ≤ 1 reﬂects the weight the investor puts on the rational forecast
(P∗
t+1) and Pm












13Levin and Wright (1997) examine the impact of speculation on house prices in the UK. Their results
suggest that speculation had an signiﬁcant impact.
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This momentum forecast makes medium term price trends more persistent and leads to
acceleration of house price ﬂuctuations. The resulting momentum house price P∗m
t can be
calibrated in the same way as the fundamental house price in section 2.3. Again, we minimise
the mean square errors (P∗m
t − Pa
t ). Only now we also have to chose the value for the
parameter μ that leads to the lowest MSE. The lower and upper bound for the parameter
μ are zero and one, respectively. This applies to all six countries. For simplicity we assume
that k is two years (or eight quarters, respectively) for all six countries. The results of the
calibration are shown in Figure 5.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
Following equation (19) the ﬁt between P∗m
t and Pa
t cannot get weaker than the ﬁt between
P∗
t and Pa
t . The reason for this is that μ can get one and, therefore, P∗m
t = P∗
t . As we can
see in Figure 5 in CH, the NL, the UK and the US the diﬀerence between P∗m
t and P∗
t is very
small. Here the contribution of the momentum trading is rather small. For IRL and JAP,
on the other hand, the consideration of momentum trading improves the ﬁt to actual house
prices considerably. This is especially true for the price cycle in the 1970’s and the bubble
around 1990 in JAP and the recent house price increase in IRL.
3.4 Herding Behaviour
Another possible explanation for the actual development of house prices is herding behaviour.
There are various models that explain and describe herding behaviour in asset markets.14
Lux (1995), for example, develops a model where herding behaviour occurs because there
is a positive feedback between the development of the market price and the development of
investors’ sentiment. Accordingly, the market price increases if the sentiment is getting more
positive. The sentiment, on the other hand, increases if there is an excess return. The return
itself is positively related to price increases and dividends and negatively related to the price
level. If, for example, the price increases there might be an excess return. Now agents become
more optimistic. This pushes the price higher and higher. There comes a point where the
14For example Avery and Zemsky (1998), Banerjee (1992) or Romer (1993).
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price increase is to small to justify the high price level or the low dividend yield, respectively.
Now the excess return gets negative, agents get more pessimistic and the bubble bursts.
To model this mechanism, we assume that an optimistic investor demands a risk premium
which leads to ρ+ and a pessimistic investor demands a risk premium which leads to ρ−, where
ρ+ < ρ−. The representative investor demands a risk premium which leads to:
ρt = νtρ+ + (1 − νt)ρ−, (21)
where νt is the weight the representative investor puts on the optimistic view. In other
words, νt reﬂects the investors’ mood. We further assume that νt develops according to
the development of the excess return of an investment in houses. The ex post return of an
investment in a house is:
Rh
t =
Ht + (1 − δ)Pt+1
Pt
. (22)
We deﬁne the relevant discount rate of a neutral investor investment as the benchmark return:
R∗ = 1 +
ρ+ + ρ−
2
+ ¯ m. (23)
The excess return is the diﬀerence between Rh
t and R∗. If this excess return is positive,
investors become more optimistic and if it is negative, they become more pessimistic:
νt+1 = νt + τ(Rh
t−1 − R∗)(1 − νt) if Rh
t−1 ≥ R∗ and (24)
νt+1 = νt + τ(Rh
t−1 − R∗)νt if Rh
t−1 < R∗, (25)
where τ ≥ 0 inﬂuences the speed of the mood adjustment or how strong the mood reacts on
the excess return, respectively.
For simplicity we assume that expectations with regard to future rents and interest rates
are the same as in the constant user costs approach: Eh
t (Ht+i) = Ek
t (Ht+i) = (1 + w)iHt
and Eh
t (mt+i) = Ek
t (mt+i) = ¯ m. The house price under herding behaviour (Ph





ρt + ¯ m + δ − w + δw
. (26)
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We calibrate this herding price in the same way as the fundamental price in section 2.3.
Again, we minimise the mean square errors (Ph
t − Pa
t ). Only now we also have to choose
optimal values for the parameter τ and a starting value for ν0. For both paramerters the
lower and upper bound is zero and one, respectively. For the optimistic and pessimistic
parameters ρ+ and ρ− we assume that they are equal to the upper (ρ+=12%) and the lower
bound (ρ−=-1%) of the parameter ρ (see section 2.3). The results of the calibration are
shown in Figure 6.
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
As we can see, the herding approach is able to explain the price bubbles in CH, UK and JAP
around 1990 and the recent price increase in the UK much better than the fundamental price.
Therefore, a possible explanation for the price increases in the late 1980s as well as for recent
price increases in some countries is that an excess return from an investment in houses led
to a positive market sentiment. The positive sentiment pushed the price higher and higher.
Then the price increase got to small to justify the high house price and the bubble burst.
This led to a negative sentiment, higher risk premiums and lower house prices. According
to the mean square errors, Ph
t improves the ﬁt to actual prices in all but one country (IRL).
Note, however, that the MSEs of Ph
t cannot get higher than the MSEs of the constant user
costs price (Pk
t ). The reason for this is that if τ is zero, the development of Ph
t would be
identical to the development of Pk
t . This is the case for JAP.
3.5 Comparison
To compare and judge the diﬀerent approaches, we compare their mean square errors (MSE)
with the MSE of the corresponding fundamental prices. For each country and each model
variation Table 4 shows the reduction of the MSE. According to this table, the constant user
costs assumption only improves the MSE for CH and JAP. For the more sophisticated ap-
proaches the results are better: The speculative bubble and the herding behaviour approach
leads to a smaller MSE in all but one country (IRL). Also the momentum trading approach
lowers the MSE in all but one country (NL). However, the average improvement is smaller
than with the speculative bubble and the herding behaviour approach.
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[Insert Table 4 about here]
As we have seen, there are diﬀerent possible explanations for the high ﬂuctuations of house
prices. It is interesting to notice that there is not an approach that is superior for all countries.
For JAP, NL and the US the speculative bubble approach leads to the lowest MSE. For IRL
the momentum trading approach is the best and for CH and the UK the herding behaviour
approach leads to the lowest MSE.
A visual comparison of the diﬀerent house prices shows that the best explanation for the
price bubbles around 1990 in CH and the UK is herding behaviour. The best explanation
for the bubble around 1990 in JAP and the recent house price increase in the NL, the UK
and the US seems to be speculation and for the recent price increase in IRL it seems to be
momentum forecasts.
4 Conclusion
There are numerous studies which show that stock prices ﬂuctuate more than fundamentally
justiﬁed. In this paper we have shown that this is also the case with house prices. In contrast
to the (formerly) widespread opinion that a house is a very safe asset, we have shown that
there are substantial over- and undervaluations in the housing market from time to time and
that actual house prices ﬂuctuate more than their fundamental values. This implies that
there are undesirable price bubbles from time to time.
The theoretical literature oﬀers diﬀerent approaches to explain excess volatility in stock
markets. We have shown that these approaches can also help explaining developments in
housing markets. However, their performance diﬀers between the diﬀerent countries and
they are not suﬃcient to explain the observed bubbles to their full extent. One reason for
this is that the model does not consider an important part of the housing market: banks. The
willingness of banks to provide mortgages can have a signiﬁcant impact on the demand for
houses and therefore on house prices. This seems to be especially relevant for the recent crisis
in the US. Nevertheless, the paper has demonstrated that the behaviour of house investors
can be seen as a possible explanation for actual ﬂuctuations of house prices. According to
the diﬀerent approaches, agents overreact to fundamentals and they are inﬂuenced by the
2424 25
past development of prices and the past returns on an investment in a house.
Swiss National Bank
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[Insert Table 5 about here]
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Table 1: Average Deviation of Actual (M) from Fundamental (H) Rents and
Parameter Values of the Calibration of Fundamental Rents
Country Mean(|H − M| /M) α1 ˆ d δ S0
CH 3.8% 11’742 30 0.06% 11’563
IRL 11.9% 476 11 3.07% 1002
JAP 7.7% 6’632 0.07 0.001% 4’512
NL 5.8% 11’241 0.64 0.001% 9’485
UK 9.1% 8’277 0 0.03% 7’242
US 1.4% 4’810 2.8 0.2% 2’613
Table 2: Fundamental (P∗) vs. Actual (Pa) House Prices










CH 0.36% 0.04% 13% 45% -21%
IRL 0.42% 0.26% 32% 84% -55%
JAP 0.45% 0.07% 10% 30% -26%
NL 0.71% 0.06% 23% 72% -29%
UK 0.94% 0.21% 17% 55% -36%
US 0.11% 0.09% 8% 21% -12%
Table 3: Parameter Values of the Calibration of House Prices
Country α2 ρ w ¯ m
CH 0.034 9.4% 0.0% 4.0%
IRL 0.027 5.5% 1.5% 0.5%
JAP 0.036 12.0% -2.0% 3.5%
NL 0.023 7.4% 3.0% 2.0%
UK 0.008 2.5% 2.5% 2%
US 0.041 12.0% 1.5% 3.0%







Country Pk Pb Pm Ph
CH 6% 5% 6% 32%
IRL -77% -63% 58% -10%
JAP 15% 18% 16% 15%
NL -121% 57% 0% 9%
UK -129% 55% 6% 56%
US -78% 37% 10% 4%
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Table 5: Data description
Variable Description Source Transformation
Yt Real Gross Domestic Product IMF and
OECD
combination of time series
and seasonal adjustment by
annual growth rates
Bt Construction of Dwellings
(permits: CH, IRL and NL;





seasonal adjustment by an-
nual growth rates
Nt Population IMF annual data transformed
into quarterly by linear in-
terpolation
mt Mortgage loans, average rate
(except: for IRL 10-y gov sec.
yield until 1996 Q1 and for




in real terms (divided by
CPI growth rate in next 12
month); IRL: 10-y gov sec.
yield until 1996 Q1
Mt CPI housing (CH, IRL and
UK) and rent (JAP, NL and
US)
OECD seasonal adjustment by an-
nual growth rates; in real
terms (divided by CPI)
Pa
t Residential property prices








seasonal adjustment by an-
nual growth rates; in real
terms (divided by CPI)
CPIt Consumer Price Index IMF seasonal adjustment by an-
nual growth rates
3030 31
Figure 1: Fundamental (H) vs. Actual (M) Rents.
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Figure 2: Fundamental (P∗) vs. Actual (Pa)Real House Prices
3232 33
Figure 3: Constant User Costs (Pk), Fundamental (P∗) and Actual (Pa) Real
House Prices
3334 35
Figure 4: Speculative Bubble (Pb), Fundamental (P∗) and Actual (Pa) Real
House Prices
3434 35
Figure 5: Momentum (P∗m), Fundamental (P∗) and Actual (Pa) Real House
Prices
3536
Figure 6: Herding (Ph), Fundamental (P∗) and Actual (Pa) Real House Prices
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